Navy Admiral James Stavridis has argued that China’s distant-water fishing fleet is part of a strategy of “hybrid warfare.” Through “coercive maritime diplomacy,” Chinese fishing vessels assist Beijing in asserting claims in contested waters by using sheer numbers to overwhelm another nation’s ability to enforce their sovereignty. Beijing uses the Maritime Militia as part of a coordinated effort to challenge maritime sovereignty and conduct surveillance of its neighbors within the “gray zone” where triggered responses are unlikely to rise to the level of direct military intervention. China has militarized part of its fishing fleet as part of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia, which can be employed as a paramilitary force in altercations with other national fishing fleets and law enforcement vessels. The fishing fleet also receives government subsidies that incentivize private companies and ship owners to expand their fleet and range. China has the largest distant-water fishing fleet in the world at over 17,000 vessels. Though Beijing denies irresponsible fishing practices, the data suggests otherwise. When Chinese fishermen act aggressively and illegally, it is likely that they have at least some form of tacit government approval considering the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime. In 2017 Ecuadorian authorities seized a Chinese fishing vessel with over 300 tons of illegally fished sharks (some endangered) comprising of roughly 6,600 animals. Unable to adequately monitor such a large flotilla with their own assets, Ecuador requested assistance and intelligence sharing from Colombia and Peru.Įcuador had reason to worry. Ecuador responded by sending surveillance assets to monitor the flotilla. The situation escalated when many vessels within the fleet turned off their satellite transponders to avoid being monitored and, presumably, the scrutiny of Ecuadorian authorities. Almost all of them were part of the Chinese distant-water fishing fleet. Recently, Ecuador raised alarm over the presence of 340 fishing vessels congregating outside the protected waters of the Galapagos Islands. can help counter malign Chinese fishing activities by supporting allies with cheap surveillance networks and capitalizing on environmental volunteerism. Just as Coastal Patrol helped plug a capability gap and hobble German U-boat operations, the U.S. should rely on a combination of technology and global volunteerism. In order to adequately counter China’s aggressive overseas fishing fleet, the U.S. is seemingly at a disadvantage when compared to China’s ability to mobilize and militarize commercial enterprises with plausible deniability like its vast distant-water fishing fleet. While U-boat records do not attribute any U-boat losses to Coastal Patrol sorties, these civilian fliers were very successful in forcing U-boats to submerge, greatly curtailing their ability to attack and communicate.Īs strategic competition heats up between the U.S.
military assets could adequately cover defense requirements and the Coastal Patrol stood down. Notably, the crew and aircraft were not military, but instead part of a civilian volunteer organization.
Navy and Coast Guard assets were stretched thin. The two pilots of the Coastal Patrol aircraft, armed with two depth charges, maneuvered into an employment position and dropped their charges. U-boats were stalking and sinking merchant ships transporting vital war materials and U.S. It was the summer of 1942 and the Eastern Seaboard of the United States was a battleground. As the German U-boat prepared to ascend to periscope depth, the crew was unaware that a Grumman G-44 Widgeon Coastal Patrol aircraft had been shadowing it for the last three hours.
0 kommentar(er)
